Same tests — just worded differently
This only changes how each result is explained. Your scores never change. Choose Normal for plain, everyday wording that tells you what a result means. Choose Advanced to also see the technical terms — the exact settings and methods behind each check — if you know the jargon.
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How your speed numbers are shown. MB/s is what download managers report; Kbps suits slow connections.
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Fingerprint
How your browser can be recognized -- the way it renders graphics and sound, plus your fonts, user agent, and TLS handshake signature.
IP…
Location…
ISP…
ASN…
Canvas Fingerprint
Color key Green — healthy / above target Blue — normal / neutral info Amber — below target, worth a look Red — leak or serious problem Grey — not run yet
The canvas fingerprint is generated by asking your browser to draw a specific string of text and shapes onto an invisible HTML5 canvas, then reading back the raw pixel data and hashing it. The result depends on your GPU, graphics driver, OS font renderer, anti-aliasing settings, and browser build -- each layer contributes tiny sub-pixel differences. Two visually identical images from two different machines produce different hashes. This technique is called "canvas fingerprinting" and has been widely deployed by ad networks and fraud-detection vendors since roughly 2014.
So what?
Canvas fingerprints are one of the most powerful non-cookie tracking signals on the web. They survive incognito mode, cookie clearing, IP changes, and VPN switches, because they measure your hardware and software stack rather than any stored state. Combined with two or three other signals (fonts, WebGL, audio) they routinely identify a specific browser installation with better than 99% accuracy. Even worse, the hash is stable across sites, so any network that collects it can link your activity across everywhere it is embedded.
Now what?
Your canvas value is randomized or blocked -- this is what Brave with Shields up, Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting, and Tor Browser all do. Every page load produces a different hash, so trackers cannot link your sessions. Keep doing what you are doing.
Your canvas fingerprint is stable and readable. That is the default for Chrome, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, and Safari -- they all return the same pixel data every time. Fix it in order of aggressiveness: (1) Switch to Brave -- Shields randomizes the canvas per-session by default, no config needed. (2) Switch to Firefox and set privacy.resistFingerprinting=true in about:config -- this randomizes canvas plus a dozen other signals. (3) For maximum anonymity switch to Tor Browser, which does the same as Firefox RFP but also routes traffic through Tor. AVOID Safari: it does not randomize the canvas and Apple has resisted implementing this protection.
Your canvas produced a value but it may be partially protected. If you are on Firefox without RFP, or Brave with Shields down for this site, you are exposing the raw hash. Turn Shields back on, or enable privacy.resistFingerprinting, then re-run.
If your canvas hash is stable, switch to Brave (Shields up) or Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true. For anonymous sessions use Tor Browser.
WebGL Renderer
Color key Green — healthy / above target Blue — normal / neutral info Amber — below target, worth a look Red — leak or serious problem Grey — not run yet
WebGL is the browser API that lets pages render 3D graphics using your real GPU. As a side-effect it exposes two extension strings -- UNMASKED_VENDOR_WEBGL and UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL -- that reveal the underlying hardware ("NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2060", "Apple M2", "Intel Iris Xe Graphics"). On Windows the renderer string is usually wrapped in "ANGLE(...)" because Chrome and Firefox use ANGLE, Google's translation layer that converts WebGL calls into DirectX so games and 3D sites work without native OpenGL. We strip the ANGLE wrapper and show you the actual GPU underneath.
So what?
Your GPU model is one of the highest-entropy fingerprint signals available: there are hundreds of distinct GPU strings in the wild, and yours narrows you down dramatically. Combined with your screen resolution it often uniquely identifies your machine within your household. Ad networks pair the renderer string with the canvas fingerprint (which also depends on the GPU) to build a stable hardware ID that survives every form of cookie or IP reset.
Now what?
Your renderer is blocked, spoofed, or returns a generic value like "Google Inc. -- Google SwiftShader" (software rendering). That is Brave with Shields up, Tor Browser, or Firefox with webgl.disabled=true. No action needed.
Your real GPU model was exposed. To fix: (1) Brave with Shields up spoofs the renderer to a generic value automatically -- easiest option. (2) Firefox: set webgl.disabled=true in about:config to block WebGL entirely, OR set privacy.resistFingerprinting=true which spoofs the renderer. (3) Tor Browser blocks WebGL by default. Blocking WebGL will break 3D sites and some map/game features -- if that matters, use Brave which spoofs rather than blocks. AVOID Chrome, Edge, Safari, Opera, Vivaldi: none of them hide the renderer without extensions.
WebGL is partially exposed. You may be on a browser that shows the renderer but hides some other WebGL parameters. For full protection switch to Brave (Shields up) or Firefox with RFP.
To hide your GPU model, switch to Brave with Shields up, or enable privacy.resistFingerprinting in Firefox.
Audio Fingerprint
Color key Green — healthy / above target Blue — normal / neutral info Amber — below target, worth a look Red — leak or serious problem Grey — not run yet
The audio fingerprint is generated by running a short waveform through the browser's Web Audio API and measuring the exact numeric output of the audio processing pipeline. Small floating-point differences between CPU architectures, OS audio stacks, and browser builds produce a stable hash that identifies your machine -- similar in spirit to the canvas fingerprint but using DSP instead of graphics. No sound is played and no microphone is used.
So what?
Audio fingerprints are quieter than canvas or WebGL fingerprints but just as durable. They are hardware-and-software-dependent, so they survive VPNs, incognito mode, and cookie clearing. Trackers that got burned by canvas-blocking extensions started adopting audio fingerprints around 2016 as a backup signal, and they are now standard in commercial fingerprinting SDKs. Because most users have never heard of the technique, most privacy tools do not block it by default.
Now what?
Your audio value is randomized, blocked, or matches a common generic fingerprint. That is Brave with Shields up, Tor Browser, or Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true. Keep it that way.
Your audio fingerprint is stable. To fix: (1) Brave with Shields up randomizes the audio signal per-session -- the easiest fix. (2) Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true does the same. (3) Tor Browser blocks the Web Audio API entirely. Chrome, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, and Safari do not offer any built-in protection against audio fingerprinting -- you would need an extension like CanvasBlocker, which also handles audio, but switching browsers is more reliable.
The audio API returned a value that may be partially protected. Turn Brave Shields on for this site, or enable Firefox RFP, and re-run.
To block audio fingerprinting, use Brave with Shields up, Firefox with RFP enabled, or Tor Browser.
Installed Fonts
Color key Green — healthy / above target Blue — normal / neutral info Amber — below target, worth a look Red — leak or serious problem Grey — not run yet
—
The exact fonts on your system reveal your identity.
This test measures which fonts from a probe list of ~40 common desktop fonts your system has installed. It works by rendering each font name in a hidden element and measuring the resulting text width -- if the font is missing, the browser falls back to a default and produces a different width. The set of fonts on your machine reflects which OS you run, which office suite you have installed, which design tools, which language packs, and any custom fonts you have added. That combination is highly personal.
So what?
Installed font lists are one of the top three fingerprinting signals in the EFF Panopticlick study and every commercial fingerprint SDK. A user with Adobe Creative Suite has a very different font list from a user with only Microsoft Office, and both differ from a fresh Windows install. Cross-referencing the font list with the OS and locale usually narrows a visitor to a few hundred people worldwide -- combined with any other signal, it identifies you specifically. The technique works even when JavaScript font enumeration APIs are disabled, because the width-measurement trick uses only basic DOM APIs.
Now what?
Zero or only a handful of very common fonts were detected -- your browser is either running in a font-restricted mode (Tor Browser bundles a fixed font set) or blocking font probing (Brave with Shields up on strict mode, Firefox with RFP). No action needed.
Your full font list was probed. That is Chrome, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, and Safari all reveal this. To fix: (1) Tor Browser bundles its own fixed set of fonts and blocks probing, so every Tor user reports the same list -- strongest protection. (2) Brave with Shields set to Aggressive blocks font enumeration. (3) Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true restricts the font list to a small standard set. AVOID Chrome and Safari: neither offers a way to restrict font probing without extensions.
A partial font list was detected. You may be on Brave with Shields set to Standard rather than Aggressive, or Firefox without RFP. Raise your privacy settings and re-run.
To hide your font list, use Tor Browser, Brave with Shields on Aggressive, or Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true.
User Agent
Color key Green — healthy / above target Blue — normal / neutral info Amber — below target, worth a look Red — leak or serious problem Grey — not run yet
The User-Agent (UA) header is a string every browser sends on every HTTP request. It declares the browser name and version, the rendering engine, the operating system, and often the CPU architecture. Alongside it modern browsers also send User-Agent Client Hints (Sec-CH-UA-*) which repeat some of this information in structured form, and an Accept-Language header that reveals your preferred languages in priority order. Together these headers describe your software stack in enough detail that servers can decide how to render pages for you -- and how to track you.
So what?
The UA on its own is not unique -- millions of people run "Chrome 138 on Windows 10." But combined with Accept-Language, screen resolution, timezone, and any hardware signal it collapses your anonymity fast. UA strings also leak more than you think: they reveal the exact browser build number (which can identify unpatched machines to attackers), the OS version (which narrows corporate vs personal machines), and in some cases the device model. Accept-Language often reveals more about you than your IP: someone whose UA says "en-US" but whose Accept-Language is "ar,en-US;q=0.9" has just declared their first language.
Now what?
Your UA and language headers are generic and match a common configuration. Tor Browser and Brave with Shields up both send a standardized UA that matches millions of other users. Keep those defaults on.
Your UA reveals a specific build and your Accept-Language exposes multiple languages in priority order. To fix: (1) Tor Browser forces every user to send the same UA -- best possible protection. (2) Brave with Shields up normalizes the UA and strips detailed Client Hints. (3) Firefox: install the "User-Agent Switcher and Manager" extension, and set intl.accept_languages to just "en-US, en" in about:config to hide your other languages. AVOID Chrome, Edge, Safari: they send the most detailed UA and Client Hints by default and offer no way to reduce them without extensions.
Your UA is exposed but not the full Client Hints set -- probably Firefox or Safari, which do not yet fully implement UA-CH. Still worth switching to Tor or Brave for anonymous sessions.
To standardize your UA, use Tor Browser or Brave with Shields up. Trim Accept-Language to a single locale in your browser settings.
TLS JA3/JARM Fingerprint
Color key Green — healthy / above target Blue — normal / neutral info Amber — below target, worth a look Red — leak or serious problem Grey — not run yet
—
A signature from your very first connection packet.
Cloudflare-provided ja3_hash from TLS ClientHello.
JA3 is a fingerprint of the TLS Client Hello message your browser sends when it opens an HTTPS connection. It hashes the exact list of TLS versions, cipher suites, extensions, and elliptic curves your browser advertises, in the exact order they appear. Different browsers and different browser versions produce different JA3 hashes -- Chrome 138 has one JA3, Firefox 128 has another, Tor Browser has a very specific one. JARM is the server-side counterpart that fingerprints the server rather than the client, but the two are often discussed together. Both operate below the HTTP layer, so no JavaScript is involved and the fingerprint travels with every TLS connection.
So what?
JA3 fingerprints see through most consumer privacy tools. VPNs do not change your JA3 (it is the same TLS library either way). Tor does not change your JA3 unless you use the Tor Browser specifically. Ad-blocking and script-blocking extensions do not touch it. The result is that even sophisticated users who think they are anonymous often have a distinctive JA3 that identifies them across sites. Anti-fraud vendors, bot-detection services (Cloudflare, DataDome, PerimeterX), and state-level censorship systems all use JA3 to distinguish real browsers from scripts, and to correlate the same browser across separate sessions.
Now what?
Your JA3 matches a common Tor Browser or Brave signature that many users share. Nothing to do.
Your JA3 is a distinctive fingerprint. To fix: (1) Use Tor Browser -- every Tor user shares the same JA3 by design. (2) Brave and Firefox produce reasonably common JA3 values that blend into large user pools. (3) Chrome and Edge JA3s are also common but their other fingerprints (canvas, WebGL, fonts) are much worse, so they are not a good overall trade. Note that changing your JA3 is genuinely hard: it requires changing your TLS library, which means changing browsers -- extensions and settings cannot help.
Your JA3 is uncommon but not unique. You may be on a niche or outdated browser. Update to a mainstream browser (Brave, Firefox, or Tor) so your JA3 blends into a larger crowd.
We could not capture your JA3 in this session -- that usually means the request path did not surface the raw TLS metadata. This is informational only; JA3 is still visible to every server you connect to.
To make your JA3 blend in, use Tor Browser (identical JA3 across all users), Brave, or Firefox. Extensions and VPNs do not change your JA3.
Your threat model
How much do you care? Slide to re-weight what counts as a concern -- from "just no obvious leaks" to "zero trackable surface." Same results, your risk tolerance.
How identifiable is your browser?
Every signal below adds identifying information. Toggle the fixable ones -- or simulate a hardened browser -- to see how much more you would blend in.
1 in ~…
An estimate from how much identifying information each signal typically leaks (based on published fingerprinting research such as EFF Cover Your Tracks) -- a rough guide to how trackable your browser is, not a lookup against a real database. "Blocking" a signal here is a simulation to show its effect; to actually block them, use a privacy browser like Brave or Tor.
Canvas Fingerprint
What is this?
The canvas fingerprint is generated by asking your browser to draw a specific string of text and shapes onto an invisible HTML5 canvas, then reading back the raw pixel data and hashing it. The result depends on your GPU, graphics driver, OS font renderer, anti-aliasing settings, and browser build -- each layer contributes tiny sub-pixel differences. Two visually identical images from two different machines produce different hashes. This technique is called "canvas fingerprinting" and has been widely deployed by ad networks and fraud-detection vendors since roughly 2014.
So what?
Canvas fingerprints are one of the most powerful non-cookie tracking signals on the web. They survive incognito mode, cookie clearing, IP changes, and VPN switches, because they measure your hardware and software stack rather than any stored state. Combined with two or three other signals (fonts, WebGL, audio) they routinely identify a specific browser installation with better than 99% accuracy. Even worse, the hash is stable across sites, so any network that collects it can link your activity across everywhere it is embedded.
Now what?
Your canvas value is randomized or blocked -- this is what Brave with Shields up, Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting, and Tor Browser all do. Every page load produces a different hash, so trackers cannot link your sessions. Keep doing what you are doing.
Your canvas fingerprint is stable and readable. That is the default for Chrome, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, and Safari -- they all return the same pixel data every time. Fix it in order of aggressiveness: (1) Switch to Brave -- Shields randomizes the canvas per-session by default, no config needed. (2) Switch to Firefox and set privacy.resistFingerprinting=true in about:config -- this randomizes canvas plus a dozen other signals. (3) For maximum anonymity switch to Tor Browser, which does the same as Firefox RFP but also routes traffic through Tor. AVOID Safari: it does not randomize the canvas and Apple has resisted implementing this protection.
Your canvas produced a value but it may be partially protected. If you are on Firefox without RFP, or Brave with Shields down for this site, you are exposing the raw hash. Turn Shields back on, or enable privacy.resistFingerprinting, then re-run.
If your canvas hash is stable, switch to Brave (Shields up) or Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true. For anonymous sessions use Tor Browser.
WebGL is the browser API that lets pages render 3D graphics using your real GPU. As a side-effect it exposes two extension strings -- UNMASKED_VENDOR_WEBGL and UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL -- that reveal the underlying hardware ("NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2060", "Apple M2", "Intel Iris Xe Graphics"). On Windows the renderer string is usually wrapped in "ANGLE(...)" because Chrome and Firefox use ANGLE, Google's translation layer that converts WebGL calls into DirectX so games and 3D sites work without native OpenGL. We strip the ANGLE wrapper and show you the actual GPU underneath.
So what?
Your GPU model is one of the highest-entropy fingerprint signals available: there are hundreds of distinct GPU strings in the wild, and yours narrows you down dramatically. Combined with your screen resolution it often uniquely identifies your machine within your household. Ad networks pair the renderer string with the canvas fingerprint (which also depends on the GPU) to build a stable hardware ID that survives every form of cookie or IP reset.
Now what?
Your renderer is blocked, spoofed, or returns a generic value like "Google Inc. -- Google SwiftShader" (software rendering). That is Brave with Shields up, Tor Browser, or Firefox with webgl.disabled=true. No action needed.
Your real GPU model was exposed. To fix: (1) Brave with Shields up spoofs the renderer to a generic value automatically -- easiest option. (2) Firefox: set webgl.disabled=true in about:config to block WebGL entirely, OR set privacy.resistFingerprinting=true which spoofs the renderer. (3) Tor Browser blocks WebGL by default. Blocking WebGL will break 3D sites and some map/game features -- if that matters, use Brave which spoofs rather than blocks. AVOID Chrome, Edge, Safari, Opera, Vivaldi: none of them hide the renderer without extensions.
WebGL is partially exposed. You may be on a browser that shows the renderer but hides some other WebGL parameters. For full protection switch to Brave (Shields up) or Firefox with RFP.
To hide your GPU model, switch to Brave with Shields up, or enable privacy.resistFingerprinting in Firefox.
The audio fingerprint is generated by running a short waveform through the browser's Web Audio API and measuring the exact numeric output of the audio processing pipeline. Small floating-point differences between CPU architectures, OS audio stacks, and browser builds produce a stable hash that identifies your machine -- similar in spirit to the canvas fingerprint but using DSP instead of graphics. No sound is played and no microphone is used.
So what?
Audio fingerprints are quieter than canvas or WebGL fingerprints but just as durable. They are hardware-and-software-dependent, so they survive VPNs, incognito mode, and cookie clearing. Trackers that got burned by canvas-blocking extensions started adopting audio fingerprints around 2016 as a backup signal, and they are now standard in commercial fingerprinting SDKs. Because most users have never heard of the technique, most privacy tools do not block it by default.
Now what?
Your audio value is randomized, blocked, or matches a common generic fingerprint. That is Brave with Shields up, Tor Browser, or Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true. Keep it that way.
Your audio fingerprint is stable. To fix: (1) Brave with Shields up randomizes the audio signal per-session -- the easiest fix. (2) Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true does the same. (3) Tor Browser blocks the Web Audio API entirely. Chrome, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, and Safari do not offer any built-in protection against audio fingerprinting -- you would need an extension like CanvasBlocker, which also handles audio, but switching browsers is more reliable.
The audio API returned a value that may be partially protected. Turn Brave Shields on for this site, or enable Firefox RFP, and re-run.
To block audio fingerprinting, use Brave with Shields up, Firefox with RFP enabled, or Tor Browser.
This test measures which fonts from a probe list of ~40 common desktop fonts your system has installed. It works by rendering each font name in a hidden element and measuring the resulting text width -- if the font is missing, the browser falls back to a default and produces a different width. The set of fonts on your machine reflects which OS you run, which office suite you have installed, which design tools, which language packs, and any custom fonts you have added. That combination is highly personal.
So what?
Installed font lists are one of the top three fingerprinting signals in the EFF Panopticlick study and every commercial fingerprint SDK. A user with Adobe Creative Suite has a very different font list from a user with only Microsoft Office, and both differ from a fresh Windows install. Cross-referencing the font list with the OS and locale usually narrows a visitor to a few hundred people worldwide -- combined with any other signal, it identifies you specifically. The technique works even when JavaScript font enumeration APIs are disabled, because the width-measurement trick uses only basic DOM APIs.
Now what?
Zero or only a handful of very common fonts were detected -- your browser is either running in a font-restricted mode (Tor Browser bundles a fixed font set) or blocking font probing (Brave with Shields up on strict mode, Firefox with RFP). No action needed.
Your full font list was probed. That is Chrome, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, and Safari all reveal this. To fix: (1) Tor Browser bundles its own fixed set of fonts and blocks probing, so every Tor user reports the same list -- strongest protection. (2) Brave with Shields set to Aggressive blocks font enumeration. (3) Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true restricts the font list to a small standard set. AVOID Chrome and Safari: neither offers a way to restrict font probing without extensions.
A partial font list was detected. You may be on Brave with Shields set to Standard rather than Aggressive, or Firefox without RFP. Raise your privacy settings and re-run.
To hide your font list, use Tor Browser, Brave with Shields on Aggressive, or Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true.
The User-Agent (UA) header is a string every browser sends on every HTTP request. It declares the browser name and version, the rendering engine, the operating system, and often the CPU architecture. Alongside it modern browsers also send User-Agent Client Hints (Sec-CH-UA-*) which repeat some of this information in structured form, and an Accept-Language header that reveals your preferred languages in priority order. Together these headers describe your software stack in enough detail that servers can decide how to render pages for you -- and how to track you.
So what?
The UA on its own is not unique -- millions of people run "Chrome 138 on Windows 10." But combined with Accept-Language, screen resolution, timezone, and any hardware signal it collapses your anonymity fast. UA strings also leak more than you think: they reveal the exact browser build number (which can identify unpatched machines to attackers), the OS version (which narrows corporate vs personal machines), and in some cases the device model. Accept-Language often reveals more about you than your IP: someone whose UA says "en-US" but whose Accept-Language is "ar,en-US;q=0.9" has just declared their first language.
Now what?
Your UA and language headers are generic and match a common configuration. Tor Browser and Brave with Shields up both send a standardized UA that matches millions of other users. Keep those defaults on.
Your UA reveals a specific build and your Accept-Language exposes multiple languages in priority order. To fix: (1) Tor Browser forces every user to send the same UA -- best possible protection. (2) Brave with Shields up normalizes the UA and strips detailed Client Hints. (3) Firefox: install the "User-Agent Switcher and Manager" extension, and set intl.accept_languages to just "en-US, en" in about:config to hide your other languages. AVOID Chrome, Edge, Safari: they send the most detailed UA and Client Hints by default and offer no way to reduce them without extensions.
Your UA is exposed but not the full Client Hints set -- probably Firefox or Safari, which do not yet fully implement UA-CH. Still worth switching to Tor or Brave for anonymous sessions.
To standardize your UA, use Tor Browser or Brave with Shields up. Trim Accept-Language to a single locale in your browser settings.
JA3 is a fingerprint of the TLS Client Hello message your browser sends when it opens an HTTPS connection. It hashes the exact list of TLS versions, cipher suites, extensions, and elliptic curves your browser advertises, in the exact order they appear. Different browsers and different browser versions produce different JA3 hashes -- Chrome 138 has one JA3, Firefox 128 has another, Tor Browser has a very specific one. JARM is the server-side counterpart that fingerprints the server rather than the client, but the two are often discussed together. Both operate below the HTTP layer, so no JavaScript is involved and the fingerprint travels with every TLS connection.
So what?
JA3 fingerprints see through most consumer privacy tools. VPNs do not change your JA3 (it is the same TLS library either way). Tor does not change your JA3 unless you use the Tor Browser specifically. Ad-blocking and script-blocking extensions do not touch it. The result is that even sophisticated users who think they are anonymous often have a distinctive JA3 that identifies them across sites. Anti-fraud vendors, bot-detection services (Cloudflare, DataDome, PerimeterX), and state-level censorship systems all use JA3 to distinguish real browsers from scripts, and to correlate the same browser across separate sessions.
Now what?
Your JA3 matches a common Tor Browser or Brave signature that many users share. Nothing to do.
Your JA3 is a distinctive fingerprint. To fix: (1) Use Tor Browser -- every Tor user shares the same JA3 by design. (2) Brave and Firefox produce reasonably common JA3 values that blend into large user pools. (3) Chrome and Edge JA3s are also common but their other fingerprints (canvas, WebGL, fonts) are much worse, so they are not a good overall trade. Note that changing your JA3 is genuinely hard: it requires changing your TLS library, which means changing browsers -- extensions and settings cannot help.
Your JA3 is uncommon but not unique. You may be on a niche or outdated browser. Update to a mainstream browser (Brave, Firefox, or Tor) so your JA3 blends into a larger crowd.
We could not capture your JA3 in this session -- that usually means the request path did not surface the raw TLS metadata. This is informational only; JA3 is still visible to every server you connect to.
To make your JA3 blend in, use Tor Browser (identical JA3 across all users), Brave, or Firefox. Extensions and VPNs do not change your JA3.
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